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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(i)

Nature of the Case:

This is a land use case involving the payment of "community housing" fees to the City of
McCall ("McCall" or the "City").

Appellants Richard Hehr and Greystone Village, LLC

(collectively "Greystone") were required to pay a community housing fee to the City as a
condition of approval of their development to construct a Planned Unit Development ("PUD")
and subdivision called Greystone Village in McCall.

Greystone paid the City's community

housing fee by deeding ownership of nine lots worth a cumulative value of $1,170,000,
consisting of Phase III of Greystone Village, to the City. Moreover, the City required Greystone
to construct certain improvements to serve the lots, namely roads and utilities, after Greystone no
longer owned the lots.

The City's "community housing" fee was determined illegal and

unconstitutional in a separate lawsuit that the City did not appeal. Greystone filed this lawsuit
seeking reimbursement for the value of the lots deeded to McCall and the costs of constructing
improvements to those lots. The district court dismissed Greystone's Complaint on McCall's
motion for summary judgment, which Greystone now appeals.
(ii)

Course of Proceedings:

Greystone filed its Complaint and First Amended Complaint on July 15, 2010 and July
16, 2010, respectively. R. Vol. I, pp. 1, 6. Greystone' s Complaint alleges several different legal
theories against McCall for reimbursement of the value of nine lots Greystone deeded to McCall
pursuant to McCall's illegal community housing fee and for reimbursement of the costs to
construct improvements to serve the nine lots. R. Vol. I, p. 6.
McCall answered Greystone' s Complaint on August 31, 201 0, and filed a counterclaim
for breach of contract. R. Vol. I, p. 11. After very limited discovery, the City filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment on April 5, 2011. R. Vol. I, p. 143. In its motion, the City argued that
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Greystone's claim for reimbursement for the value of nine building lots conveyed to McCall was
barred under the Tort Claims Act, applicable statutes of limitation, failure to exhaust, ripeness,
and that Greystone voluntarily paid the community housing fees. R. Vol. I, p. 146. Greystone
filed its Memorandum Opposing Summary Judgment, along with supporting affidavits, on April
27, 2011.

R. Vol. II, p. 250.

Greystone opposed Valley County's Motion for Summary

Judgment on grounds that its Complaint was timely filed and supported its contention that the
community housing fee was a required fee through multiple affidavits filed with its opposing
memorandum.
The district court issued its Memorandum Decision on the City's Motion for Summary
Judgment on June 16, 2011. R. Vol. II, p. 361. The district court granted the City's motion
finding that the state law claims were barred under the Tort Claims Act, the statute of limitations
for a takings claim had expired, and Greystone's conveyance of building lots to the City was
voluntary.

!d. The district court also detennined that Greystone's federal law claims were

untimely and/or unripe. !d.
After the district court issued its Memorandum Decision, McCall submitted a proposed
judgment. Greystone filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Objection to Proposed Judgment
on June 29, 2011. R. Vol. II, p. 373. Greystone's motion was based on the fact that the Court
did not fully dispose of all of Greystone's takings claims, namely Greystone's claim that the
City's requirement that it build roads and construct utility improvements to the nine lots that the
City now owned constituted a taking of Greystone's money. !d. Greystone additionally moved
the district court to reconsider its ruling that, as a matter of law, Greystone's conveyance of the
nine lots to McCall was voluntarily because the record contained numerous and genuine issues of
material fact regarding the question of voluntariness. !d.
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Thereafter the City filed a motion seeking an award of attorney fees, which Greystone
opposed. R. Vol. III, pp. 478, 598. The district court issued a second Memorandum Decision on
October 18, 2011, denying Greystone' s Motion for Reconsideration and denying the City's
motion for an award of costs and fees. R. Vol. IV, p. 630. In denying Greystone's Motion for
Reconsideration, the district court determined that Greystone's second claim based on McCall's
requirement that Greystone incur the costs of building roads and infrastructure to support the
nine lots conveyed to the City was encompassed by and was part of Greystone's first claim for
reimbursement for the value of the nine lots conveyed to the City. !d.
The district court further determined that Greystone's conveyance of building lots must
have been voluntary because McCall had not enacted an ordinance regarding community housing
until after conveyance of the nine lots. !d. The Court did not address the affidavits or additional
evidence submitted by Greystone regarding the question of whether the conveyance was
voluntary. The district court rejected McCall's request for an award of attorney fees because
Greystone' s pursuit of the claim was not frivolous considering the complex legal issues at play
and there were no grounds to state that Greystone pursued the case without a reasonable basis in
fact or in law. Id.
The district court entered a judgment on November 22, 2011, dismissing Greystone's
Complaint with prejudice and issuing a Rule 54(b) Certificate. R. Vol. IV, p. 638. Greystone
timely filed this appeal and McCall filed a cross-appeal.
(iii)

Statement of Facts:

Community housing is also known as affordable or workforce housing.
housing is not low income housing.

Community

The purpose of community housing is to provide for

housing that is affordable to the local workforce by allocating a certain number of residences to
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be affordable to persons earning a median income that would be considered low to moderate
income. SeeR. Vol. II, p. 306.
McCall perceived that affordable housing was an issue for its local workforce and that
people working in McCall could not afford to live in McCall. R. Vol. II, p. 301.

~

4, Ex. B. The

City participated in a study on community housing needs in McCall and the surrounding area.
!d.

The study, completed in July 2005, found a significant need for affordable workforce

housing in and around McCall. !d. As a result, McCall passed Resolution 05-19 on September
22, 2005.

R. Vol. II, p. 306.

Resolution 05-19 includes a community housing policy and

requires the City to implement a program to meet affordable housing needs to benefit low and
moderate income families, local workers, and others with jobs in the City, and directs City staff
to develop inclusionary zoning ordinances to implement this community housing policy. !d.
Pursuant to Resolution 05-19, the City enacted two inclusionary zoning ordinances,
Ordinance Nos. 819 and 820, on February 22, 2006. See Groenevelt Affidavit, Exs. F, G, U.
Ordinance No. 819 requires all applicants for new subdivisions to submit an inclusionary
housing plan providing that at least twenty percent (20%) of the lots and houses in the new
subdivision be permanently deed restricted as affordable community housing.

Groenevelt

Affidavit, Exs. F, U. Ordinance No. 820, on the other hand, requires that all applicants for a
building permit first pay a community housing fee for each residential unit in order to get the
permit.

Groenevelt Affidavit, Exs. G, U.

The community housing fee paid as part of the

building permit application is to be proportional to the demand for community housing created
by that new dwelling by providing for affordable housing to low to moderate income workers
needed to maintain and service the new dwelling. !d. The fee represents the subsidy amount
necessary to construct affordable housing for these workers. !d. In short, Ordinance No. 819
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requires developers to provide for new community housing and Ordinance No. 820 requires
developers to pay a fee to be used to provide community housing.
Even prior to the enactment of Ordinance Nos. 819 and 820, the City followed a policy
requiring developers to address community housing in their application. A sitting member ofthe
City Council acknowledges that prior to Resolution 05-19 and enactment of Ordinance Nos. 819
and 820, the City required developers to provide for community housing as part of all new
development in the City. R. Vol. II, pp. 218-19, 1[1[2-4. Providing for workforce housing as part
of an application for development was obligated, it was not voluntary, and City staff were
instructed to exact community housing fees from developers as a condition to approval. Id. In
fact, based on McCall's land use approval matrix and the point system under that matrix, a
developer would not have sufficient points for approval without providing for workforce housing
as part of the application. !d.
Greystone experienced this at the time it filed its application. Greystone first filed is
application for a subdivision and PUD on January 12, 2005. Affidavit of Michelle Groenevelt,
Ex. A; 1 R. Vol. II, p. 302, 1[5. This was during the time the City was studying its concerns about
the availability of housing for the City's workforce, but before Resolution 05-19 and Ordinance
Nos. 819 and 820. R. Vol. II, pp. 218-19; R. Vol. II, p. 301, 1[ 5. Therefore, Greystone's
application for a PUD did not address or include any provisions for workforce housing.
Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. A; R. Vol. II, p. 302, 1[5. The fact that Greystone's application did not
address workforce housing notwithstanding, beginning with some of its initial meetings with the
City, planners began to push Greystone on "voluntarily" providing for community or affordable
housing as part of its development. R. Vol. II, p. 302, 1[1[5-6. It quickly became clear that it was
not within Greystone' s discretion not to include workforce housing in its development. R. Vol.
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II, p. 302,

~~5-6;

R. Vol. II, p. 226,

~

7. Further, even though Greystone's PUD application was

"grandfathered" under Ordinance No. 819, Greystone was still subject to Ordinance No. 820,
which requires the payment of community housing fees at the time a building permit is applied
for. See Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. G.
Greystone obtained final plat approval for its PUD on April 27, 2006 and entered into a
Development Agreement with McCall.

Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. R.

The Development

Agreement was recorded in Valley County as Instrument No. 308495 on May 4, 2006. !d.
Article VII, Section 7.2 of the Development Agreement states that: "[t]he appraised market value
of the lots shall provide Greystone Village with an offset against community housing fees for the
Greystone Village project.

The applicant will also receive the associated benefits of the

community housing contribution in the building permit application process."
Affidavit, Ex. R.

Groenevelt

Greystone's conveyance of the nine lots to McCall was to offset the

community housing fee required under Ordinance No. 820. As a result, Greystone conveyed the
nine building lots on July 31, 2006, which consisted of all of Phase III of Greystone Village, to
McCall in order to satisfy the community housing obligation under Ordinance No. 820.
Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. S; R. Vol. II, p. 226,

~~

3-4. On the date of conveyance, the lots had a

total value of $1,170,000.00 million dollars. Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. M.
After deeding the nine lots to McCall, the City then required Greystone to construct the
roads and utilities servicing the nine community housing lots even though Greystone no longer
owned the lots.

Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. R; R. Vol. II, p. 382,

~

3, Ex. B.

Greystone

questioned the City about this requirement because the Development Agreement did not include
any requirement or obligation that Greystone also incur the costs of constructing roads and utility

1

The Affidavit of Michelle Groenevelt was sent to the Clerk of the Idaho Supreme Court as an exhibit to the Clerk's
Record and will be subsequently referred to as the "Groenevelt Affidavit."
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improvements to the nine lots. Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. R. In a July 26, 2007, e-mail message
to Roger Millar, McCall's former Deputy City Manager, the City's Community Development
Director, Michelle Groenevelt, questioned Millar about where, in writing, had the City required
Greystone to construct roads and utilities to the nine lots because the development agreement
only addressed conveyance of the nine lots. R. Vol. II, p. 385.
Millar responded by stating that Greystone was required to construct the roads and
utilities simply because: "[p )art of subdivision is providing the infrastructure to the lots being
created. The engineering plans reflect this. It was theirs to do when they planned on selling the
lots and still theirs to do with the donation." Jd. Millar went on to state that Greystone's so
called donation " ... was good for up to the appraised value on community housing fees only.
They still have to compete for EDU." ld. The City then required Greystone to incur the costs of
constructing roadways and utility improvements to serve the nine lots.
After the City passed Ordinance Nos. 819 and 820 and Greystone had entered into a
Development Agreement with McCall, the Mountain Central Board of Realtors, Inc. sued the
City, Case No. CV 2006-490-C, in September 2006.

Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. U.

The

Mountain Central lawsuit alleged that McCall's inclusionary zoning ordinances were
unconstitutional and violated Idaho law.

ld.

Pending this litigation, the City placed a

moratorium on new applications. Nonetheless, the City continued its same practice carried on
before enactment of the inclusionary zoning ordinances to exact community housing payments.
This is reflected in an October 19, 2006, memorandum from McCall's chief planner to
Staff, the Chief Planner instructs City personnel on how to address "voluntary" community
housing mitigation with applicants. R. Vol. II, p. 382,

~

2, Ex. A; see also R. Vol. III, p. 442.

This memorandum states that applicants have an option to move forward with their projects on
the condition that the applicants "offer a form of affordable housing mitigation that is in keeping
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with the spirit and intent of the housing policy and ordinances that has [sic] been adopted by the
City." !d.
The Chief Planner's memorandum to City Staff curiously refers to any offer to mitigate
for affordable housing as a "voluntary" offer. !d. The memorandum unambiguously states,
however, that an applicant's obligation to provide for workforce housing was anything but
voluntary. The Chief Planner's memorandum states that if the applicant proposes "a means of
compensation as mitigation that is clearly insufficient, we should just return the permit to them
with a comment that in our judgment the form of consideration does not resolve the affect the
construction of the residence will have on the City's affordable housing needs." !d. Thus, the
City continued undaunted by the pending litigation in its ongoing practice of requiring the
payment of community housing fees under the guise of a "donation."
After dispositive motions were filed in the Mountain Central litigation, the district court
issued a Memorandum Decision on February 19, 2008.

Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. U.

The

decision determined that Ordinance Nos. 819 and 820 were an illegal tax, not a valid police
power regulation, and that the City forced developers to subsidize affordable housing through the
payment of fees. !d. As a result, the court held, the Ordinances exceeded McCall's legislative
authority to charge a tax and they were illegal and unconstitutional. !d. After this ruling, McCall
repealed Ordinance Nos. 819 and 820 on April 24, 2008. Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. V. The City
then passed Resolution 08-11 on April 24, 2008, to refund one hundred percent (100%) of the
community housing fees paid pursuant to Ordinance No. 820. Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. W. The
City then passed Resolution 09-10 on November 4, 2009, to take effect on December 31, 2009,
to eliminate the payment of refunds. Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. X.
Pursuant to McCall's Resolution Nos. 08-11 and 09-10, Greystone submitted a refund
request on the City's Refund Request Form on November 11,2009, identifying the amounts paid
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to the city for community housing fees. Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. Y. The City refused to refund
Greystone the value of the lots conveyed on grounds that Greystone offered to voluntarily deed
the lots to McCall. Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. X. Greystone then initiated this litigation.

ISSUED PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Did the district court err in disposing of all of Greystone's takings claims on
summary judgment?

B.

Did the district court err in holding that Greystone's inverse condemnation claims
were barred under the four year statute of limitations?

C.

Did the district court err in holding that Greystone's conveyance of nine building
lots to McCall was voluntary as a matter of law?

D.

Did the district court err in holding that Greystone failed to exhaust its
administrative remedies?

E.

Did the district court err in holding that Greystone's takings claim based on the U.S.
Constitution was not ripe and/or was barred under the two year statute of
limitations?

F.

When is the deadline to file notice of a tort claim triggered under the Idaho Tort
Claims Act when a city passes a resolution creating a right to a refund of fees?
ARGUMENT

I.

Standard of Review.
This Court employs the same standard as the district court in ruling on a motion for

summary judgment. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Pedersen, 133 Idaho 135, 138, 983 P.2d
208 (1999). Summary judgment is appropriate only when all of the evidence establishes that
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56( c); Willie v. Board a/Trustees, 138 Idaho 131, 133, 59 P.3d 302,305
(2002). The Court should liberally construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the nonmoving party. !d. The non-moving party must set forth genuine issues of material fact
by affidavit or otherwise. I.R.C.P. 56(e). Regarding constitutional claims or the interpretation
and application of a legislative act, this Court independently determines whether the facts
APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 9

support a violation. Willie at 133, 59 P.3d at 305; Driver v. Sf Corp., 139 Idaho 423, 427, 80
P.3d 1024, 1028 (2003).
II.

Did the district court err in disposing of all of Greystone's takings claims on
summary judgment?
Greystone filed its Complaint seeking monetary reimbursement against McCall for: (1)

the value of the nine lots it was required to deed to pay for community housing fees AND; (2)
reimbursement for money it spent to pay for construction costs of roadway and utilities
improvements to those nine lots. The district court incorrectly held that Greystone's claim for
just compensation for the money it spent to pay for the construction costs of roadway and utility
improvements was encompassed in, and was a part of, its claim for just compensation for the
value of the nine lots.
A complaint need only contain a concise statement of facts constituting the cause of

action and demand for relief. Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 715 P .2d 993 (1986). The purpose
of the complaint is to provide notice of the material facts upon which a claim is based. !d.; see
also I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l), (e)(2), (f). "Under modem pleading rules parties may seek alternative or

different types of relief regardless of consistency or whether based on legal or equitable grounds
or both." MK Transport, Inc. v. Grover, 101 Idaho 345,350,612 P.2d 1192, 1197 (1980); See
also I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l ). Modem pleading rules merely require a simple and concise statement of

the operative facts upon which relief may be granted on any sustainable theory and regardless of
consistency. !d. Several legal theories for recovery may draw upon the same core set facts. See
Associates Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (1987).

In Greystone's First Amended Complaint, it set forth certain facts that were common to
all its claims. R. Vol. I, p. 7. Then, as to Greystone's First Cause of Action for a declaratory
judgment, it set out in Paragraph 18 that it sought a declaration that the City's requirement that it
deed lots to pay for community housing fees was illegal. In Paragraph 19 Greystone set out a
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separate claim for a declaration that the: "utility and roadway improvements that the City
required Greystone to construct directly benefited the public as a whole, are a revenue raising
measure, and therefore, constitute an illegal tax." R. Vol. I, pp. 8-9.
Then, as to Greystone's Second Cause of Action for inverse condemnation, it set out in
Paragraph 22 of its First Amended Complaint that it sought the payment of just compensation as
a result of McCall's requirement that it pay community housing fees by forcing it to deed real
property to the City. In Paragraph 24 Greystone separately set out that: "the imposition of the
condition that Greystone construct utility improvements and/or other public improvements at its
own expense was a taking of property without just compensation and in violation of the Idaho
and Federal Constitutions." R. Vol. I, p. 9.
Likewise, Greystone's prayer for relief sets out separate, distinct requests for the court to
grant relief. Greystone's first prayer for relief asks the district court to declare that the City's
requirement that Greystone deed lots to the City was illegal. Greystone's second prayer for relief
separately asks the district court to declare: " ... that the monies expended by Greystone Village,
LLC to construct utilities and public improvements to the deeded lots were for the benefit of the
public, was illegal and, therefore, Plaintiffs are entitled to reimbursement or otherwise payment
of just compensation." R. Vol. I, p. 10.
These are two separate takings claims. They give rise to separate damages or forms of
just compensation. Greystone's first inverse condemnation claim is for the value of the nine lots
deeded to McCall. Greystone's second inverse condemnation claim is for the money spent to
construct improvements to the nine lots. Money is property in a constitutional sense that cannot
be taken for a public use without just compensation. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S.
216 (2003); BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 141 Idaho 168, 172, 108 P.3d 315, 319
(2004) (the taking of money to pay a fee pursuant to a void and unconstitutional ordinance is a
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taking of property).

Finally, and most importantly, accrual of these separate claims was

triggered at different times for purposes of calculating the statute of limitations, which is the
issue addressed immediately below.
The Court's June 16, 2011, Memorandum Decision indicates that summary judgment is
granted in full to the City and directed the City to prepare a judgment and Rule 54(b) Certificate.
The City's Motion for Summary Judgment, however, only addressed Greystone's claim for just
compensation relative to conveyance of the nine lots. The City's Motion for Summary Judgment
was completely silent as to its requirement that Greystone construct roadway improvements and
make utilities available to each of these nine lots, and Greystone's claim to recover these costs.

SeeR. Vol. I, p. 6,

~~

19, 24.

After conveying the nine lots to the City, the City still required Plaintiffs to shoulder the
costs of building the roads and providing utilities to these nine lots before the City would
approve Final Plat for Greystone Village. Appellant Richard Hehr met with City officials to
question where, in writing, Greystone was required to also construct roads and utilities to the
nine lots. SeeR. Vol. II, p. 382,

~

3, Ex. B. The Development Agreement between Greystone

and the City does not impose any requirement on Greystone to construct these improvements to
the nine lots after McCall became the owner of the lots. Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. R.
In a July 26, 2007, e-mail message to Roger Millar, McCall's former Deputy City
Manager, the City's Community Development Director, Michelle Groenevelt, questioned Millar
about where, in writing, had the City required Greystone to construct roads and utilities to the
nine lots because the development agreement only addressed conveyance of the nine lots. R.
Vol. II, p. 385. Millar responded by stating that Greystone was required to construct the roads
and utilities simply because: "[p ]art of subdivision is providing the infrastructure to the lots
being created. The engineering plans reflect this. It was theirs to do when they planned on
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selling the lots and still theirs to do with the donation." !d.

Millar went on to state that

Greystone's so called donation" ... was good for up to the appraised value on community housing
fees only. They still have to compete for EDU." Id.
Greystone asked the district court to declare that these construction requirements and
related costs, in addition to and separate from the taking of Greystone' s nine lots, constitute a
taking without payment of just compensation and an illegal tax against Greystone. See, e.g. BHA
Investments v. City o.f Boise, 141 Idaho 168, 172, 108 P .3d 315, 319 (2004) (holding that where
the government has no authority to charge a fee, the fee constitutes an illegal tax subject to the
takings clause of both the Idaho and federal constitution). It is an adjudicated fact that the City
had no legal authority to require Greystone to pay anything toward community housing,
including the building of a roadway and utilities to the nine lots conveyed to the City. The City
did not address these claims in its Motion for Summary Judgment and the district court did not
rule on these claims in its June 6, 2011, Memorandum Decision.
As a result, Greystone moved the district court to reconsider its instructions to the City to
prepare an order dismissing all of Greystone's claims. In its Second Memorandum Decision
dated October 18, 2011, the district court rejected Greystone' s Motion to Reconsider on this
issue by simply stating that that Greystone's inverse condemnation claim to recover the costs of
construction was encompassed in Greystone's inverse condemnation claim for value of the nine
lots. R. Vol. IV, p. 634. Greystone's First Amended Complaint provides notice of Greystone's
separate claims and remedies sought, and satisfies the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure governing
pleading standards. The district court's decision is in error.
The separate taking claim for the costs of road and utilities construction to the nine lots
taken by McCall is properly set out in Greystone's First Amended Complaint. See R. Vol. I, p.
6,

~~

19, 24. A claim for reimbursement of the construction costs is distinctly, plainly, and
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concisely set forth. The plain language of the Complaint provides unambiguous notice of the
different claims and the different claims for relief. The district court erred in determining that
Greystone's taking/illegal tax claim to recover the costs of road and utilities construction was
encompassed by Greystone's taking claim for the nine lots conveyed to McCall.
III.

Did the district court err in holding that Greystone's takings claims were barred
under the four year statute of limitations?

The district court held that Greystone's inverse condemnation claim regarding the nine
deeded lots to the City was barred by Idaho's four year statute of limitations. In reaching its
conclusion, the district court fixed the date of accrual for the running of the statute of limitations
on the date Greystone signed the Development Agreement providing that Greystone would
convey nine lots to the City. The district court erred in fixing the date of accrual in this case
because it misapplied the standard for establishing the date of accrual as set forth by this Court in
Tibbs v. Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 603 P.2d 1001 (1979) and carried on in McCuskey v. Canyon
County, 128 Idaho 213, 912 P.2d 100 (1996).
Additionally, the district court erred in fixing the date of accrual for Greystone's inverse
condemnation claim dealing with the roadway and utility improvements on the date the
development agreement was signed. The date of accrual of Greystone's inverse condemnation
claim for the roadway and utility improvements accrued at a much later date according to the
Tibbs-McCuskey standard.
The statute of limitations in Idaho for inverse condemnation is four (4) years. I.C. § 5224. Generally, the standard test for determining when an inverse condemnation action accrues
for purposes of the statute of limitations "is to be fixed at the point in time at which the
impairment, of such a degree and kind as to constitute a substantial interference with plaintiffs'
property interest, became apparent." Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 671, 603 P.2d
1001, 1005 (1979); See also McCuskey v. Canyon County, 128 Idaho at 217, 912 P.2d at 104
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(taking occurs and the cause of action accrues "as of the time that the full extent of plaintiffs
loss of use and enjoyment of property becomes apparent."). Damages for inverse condemnation
are assessed as of the time of the taking. McCuskey v. Canyon County, 128 Idaho at 217, 912
P.2d at 104.
In cases like McCuskey, and this one, when the government does not engage in formal
condemnation proceedings, there is always the question of when the cause of action accrues.
While the Tibbs standard for designating accrual of the claim is somewhat arbitrary, the standard
sets forth at least two distinct, but necessary events, for accrual. First, the party seeking damages
for inverse condemnation must experience a loss of use and enjoyment of property (i.e.
substantial interference with their property interest). Second, that loss of use and enjoyment
must be apparent. For example, in McCuskey the loss of use and enjoyment of the claimant's
property and the apparentness of that loss both occurred at the same time, when a stop work
order was issued on construction of the claimant's convenience store. McCuskey, 128 Idaho at
216,912 P.2d at 103.
A.

Accrual on Greystone's first taking claim did not begin until Greystone
deeded the lots to the City.

In this case, the City argued below and the district court agreed that at the very latest
Greystone's claim for inverse condemnation accrued by May 3, 2006, the date Greystone signed
a Development Agreement with the City. The district court's application of the Tibbs standard to
the facts ofthis case and accrual ofGreystone's claims is simply wrong.
Ripeness and justiciability go hand in hand with the notion of a statute of limitations
accruing. That is, in order for the statute of limitations to run on a claim, the claim must be ripe
for adjudication.

This Court has held that a property owner cannot maintain an inverse

condemnation action unless there has actually been a taking of his or her property. KMST, LLC
v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 581, 67 P.3d 56, 60 (2003) (citing Covington v. Jefferson
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County, 137 Idaho 777, 53 P.3d 828 (2002)) See also Williamson County Reg'! Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (prohibiting pre-takings
claims). A pending or potential future loss of the property is not sufficient under McCuskey or

City of Coeur d'Alene v. Simpson; actual loss of use and enjoyment of the property is required.
Here, this Court should answer the question: could Greystone have brought an inverse
condemnation claim and been paid just compensation at the time it signed the Development
Agreement? The answer is no. Greystone's inverse condemnation claim was not ripe because
the City has not taken possession of the nine lots at that time. While it was arguably apparent by
April 2006 that the City intended to exact nine lots from Greystone, awareness of a potential
future loss of use and enjoyment of property, alone, is not sufficient under McCuskey. See City

of Coeur d'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 846, 136 P.3d 310, 317 (2006) (a claim does not
exist until the landowner complies with the regulation). Greystone did not, and could not have,
lost the use and enjoyment of those lots at any time before July 31, 2006, when it conveyed title
of those lots to the City.
This is further illustrated by the fact that Greystone had no obligation to complete its
development of Greystone Village at the time it signed the Development Agreement. Greystone
could have lost its financing, lost interest in pursuing the development or otherwise decided not
to go forth with the development for a number of other reasons. Conversely, the City could not
have compelled Greystone to move forward with the development had Greystone decided not to
proceed nor could the City have compelled Greystone to convey the nine lots had Greystone not
undertaken the development.

The only thing the City could have done was terminate the

Development Agreement. See I.C. § 67-6511A ( ... A commitment may be terminated, and the
zoning designation upon which the use is based reversed, upon the failure of the requirements in

APPELLANTS' BRJEF - 16

the commitment after a reasonable time as determined by the governing board or upon the failure
of the owner. .. ).
The district court's interpretation of the Tibbs and McCuskey standard would effectively
allow government to merely express an intent to take property and then wait four years for the
statute of limitations to run before actually taking the property to avoid paying just
compensation. Based on the discussions above, Greystone asks this Court to reverse the district
court's holding that its inverse condemnation claim (regarding the nine lots) began when it
signed the Development Agreement.
B.

Accrual on Greystone's second taking claim did not begin until Greystone
constructed the roadway and utility improvements.

The roadway and utility improvements that the City required Greystone to construct, as
set forth above, constitutes a separate takings claim from the nine lots deeded to the City. The
date of accrual for Greystone's second takings claim is different from the first. As discussed
above, the record on appeal demonstrates that neither party contemplated that Greystone would
construct the roadway and utility improvements to the nine lots once ownership was transferred
to the City. Since these costs were not contemplated or discussed by the parties at the time the
Development Agreement was entered into, it would have been impossible for it to become
"apparent" to Greystone that it would lose the loss and enjoyment of its property (i.e. money
spent to pay for the costs of construction) at the time the Development Agreement was executed.
Therefore, the issue ofwhen Greystone's roadway and utility claim accrued must be remanded to
the district court for further proceedings to determine the date of accrual.
C.

Alternatively, this Court should depart from the McCuskey standard on the
same policy grounds set forth in C&G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway District No. 4
for accrual of an inverse condemnation claim.

Alternatively, if this Court affirms the district court's ruling that a party need merely be
"aware" that a taking of their property is imminent, Greystone asks this Court to depart from that
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standard for public policy reasons. The policy basis and reasoning set forth in C&G, Inc. v.

Canyon Highway District No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 75 P.3d 194 (2003), for a departure from the
Tibbs standard also establishes that no taking occurred in this case on Greystone's first takings
claim, and thus Greystone' s inverse condemnation claim accrued at the time it deeded the nine
lots to the City?
In C&G the Canyon Highway District rebuilt the Old Middleton Road over C&G's
property. Jd. at 141, 75 P.3d at 195. The Highway District discussed with C&G the possibility
of rebuilding the existing winding road over the straight section line that dissected C&G's
property for a number of years. Jd. The Highway District believed it owned an easement over
the section line and could rebuild the road without compensating C&G for taking the property on
which the road would be built. Jd. The Highway District eventually rebuilt the road over the
section line and advised C&G that due to its alleged easement, C&G was not entitled to
compensation for a taking of its property.

Jd.

C&G believed the Highway District's

representations without further inquiry. Jd.
By November 1992 the Highway District completed construction of the road's sub base
and construction was totally finished by November 1993. Jd. at 142, 75 P.3d at 196. In January
1997, when C&G hired a surveyor for development purposes, it learned for the first time there
was no easement over the section line. Jd.

C&G initiated an inverse condemnation action

against the Highway District on January 31, 1997. I d. C&G prevailed before the district court
and the Highway District appealed on grounds that the statute of limitations ran before C&G
initiated its lawsuit. Jd.

2

As to Greystone's second inverse condemnation claim for the costs of constructing improvements to the nine lots
accrual was within four years of filing the Complaint. At the earliest, Greystone did not become aware of the City's
requirement to construct these improvements until the July 26,2007, e-mail exchange. R. Vol. II, p. 385.
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On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court declined to apply the McCuskey standard on the
Issue of accrual and instead applied the "project completion rule," largely on policy
considerations. !d. at 144, 75 P.3d at 198. The policy considerations identified by the Court
included the need for certainty and efficiency in resolving claims by identifying a clearly
ascertainable date for accrual purposes, to avoid, requiring a claimant to sue prematurely. !d.
Another important consideration was this Court's recognition that the Highway District
misrepresented it had an easement over C&G's property:
Furthermore, the Highway District's erroneous belief it had an easement over the
section line caused the confusion in this case. It would be bad precedent for this
Court to condone the government's misrepresentation, albeit innocently mistaken,
by holding otherwise. The project completion rule promotes judicial economy
and certainty, which benefits all parties involved in a takings case.
!d. at 144 (underlining added).

In this case, while Greystone's claims are timely under the Tibbs-McCuskey standard, the
facts of this case also provide the same compelling policy reasons for the application of a datecertain standard similar to C&G. When the government takes or obtains the rights and title in
real property through conveyance of a deed pursuant to an unconstitutional and illegal fee, the
date of conveyance is the appropriate standard for when the taking occurs and a claim accrues
because it provides certainty and efficiency in resolving claims by providing a clearly
ascertainable date that triggers the claim. It also prevents premature legal action.
Policy reasons based on the facts of this case also dictate a departure from the Tibbs
standard.

Similar to the county's belief in C&G that it could rightfully construct over the

landowner's property, the City of McCall thought it could legally require developers to pay a
community housing fees. Greystone certainly had no reason to question the City's action at that
point either. See State v. Clark, 88 Idaho 365, 377, 399 P.2d 955, 962 (1965) (ordinances are
presumed valid and constitutional). Later, it was proven that McCall's Ordinance Nos. 819 and
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820 were illegal. For the same reasons as C&G the date definite standard should be applied in
this case.
IV.

Did the district court err in holding that Greystone's conveyance of nine building
lots to McCall was voluntary as a matter of law?
In granting Summary Judgment, the district court determined that Greystone's

conveyance of nine lots to the City, as a matter of law, was voluntary. R. Vol. II, pp. 367-69.
Since the district court believed that act was voluntary, it held that there was no taking of
Greystone's property requiring the payment of just compensation.

The district court was

incorrect because:
•
•

•
•
•

The court incorrectly attributed statements to Greystone that were in fact
statements by the City;
The court failed to recognize that Ordinance No. 820 required Greystone to pay
community housing fees and the Development Agreement merely allowed
Greystone to pay the fees by conveying real property instead of paying money;
The court failed to address Greystone's affidavits submitted that establish genuine
issues of material fact;
The court failed to consider the internal memorandum from the City Planner to
Staff, which establishes genuine issues of material fact; and
The court improperly applied KMST, LLC v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 67
P.3d 56 (2003) to the facts in this case.

Summary judgment is appropriate only when all of the evidence establishes that there are
no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Willie v. Board a/Trustees, 138 Idaho 131, 133, 59 P.3d 302, 305 (2002).
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at all times with
the party moving for summary judgment. Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 896-897, 155 P.3d
695, 697 - 698 (2007).

This Court has held that it construes the record in the light most

favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's
favor.

Jd. If reasonable persons could reach different conclusions or inferences from the

evidence, then the motion must be denied. Jd. The nonmoving party however must submit more
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than just conclusory assertions that an Issue of material fact exists to withstand summary
judgment. Id.
Attributing Incorrect Statements To Greystone:
In this case, the district court erroneously attributed statements to Greystone that it did
not make. Specifically, to support its conclusion that Greystone voluntarily conveyed the lots to
the City, the district court held:
[c]ertainly the Plaintiffs, from the record, submitted the idea of the conveyance of
these lots for community housing. . . . As pointed out in the application, there is
specific language 'while the applicant is not required to provide a Community
Housing Plan, the applicant has agreed to deed the nine single family residential
lots that constitute Phase 3 of the project to the City of McCall to provide
community housing.
SeeR. Vol. II, pp. 968-69.
The district court misread and misapplied the evidence presented on summary judgment.
This language quoted by the district court to conclude that Greystone acted voluntarily is not in
Greystone's application. Rather, the quoted language is Finding of Fact No. 16 found in the
April 27, 2006, McCall City Council Planning and Zoning Commission Findings and Conclusion
Regarding Application for Final Plat Approval. Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. Q. The district court's
entire conclusion is based on a statement by the City, not Greystone. This is a self-serving
statement made by the City's Planning and Zoning Commission; it cannot be attributed to
Greystone.
Failing To Consider Application of Ordinance No. 820:
The district court also erred in holding that since Ordinance 819 had not been enacted at
the time Greystone submitted its application, it somehow meant that Greystone's conveyance of
the lots was voluntarily made. The district court held:
From the totality of the record before the Court, the dedication of these lots was a
voluntary action on the part of the Plaintiffs. No ordinances were in effect at the time
of the Development Agreement that compelled the Plaintiffs to convey these lots.
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Certainly the Plaintiffs, from the record, submitted the idea of the conveyance of
these lots for community housing to the City. Ordinance No. 819 did not apply to the
Plaintiffs because it had not been enacted until after they had filed for their SUB
application.
R. Vol. II, p. 368. The district court leaps to this incredible conclusion without any citation to
legal authority.
Greystone is unaware of any reported case to support the district court's conclusion that
the payment of a community housing fee absent an ordinance compelling such payment means
the payment must have been voluntary. Moreover, Greystone finds no case law holding the nonexistence of an ordinance is a prerequisite for a taking to arise in an inverse condemnation claim.
See e.g. Noll an v. Cal Coastal Comm 'n, 483 U.S. 825 ( 1987) (Supreme Court held that the

defendant's requirement that the landowner grant a public easement was considered a taking; the
case did not involve an ordinance compelling the landowner to grant a public easement).
Although Ordinance No. 819 had not been enacted by the time of Greystone's
application, it does not mean that Greystone was not subject to community housing
requirements. 3

The City still had Ordinance No. 820, which required the payment of a

community housing fee as a condition for obtaining a building permit. This is where the City
compelled Greystone to provide for community housing.
Proof can be found by reviewing Article VII, Section 7.2 of the Development Agreement,
which states: "[t]he appraised market value of the lots shall provide Greystone Village with an
offset against community housing fees for the Greystone Village project. The applicant will also
receive the associated benefits of the community housing contribution in the building permit
allocation process." Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. R.

(underlining added). In other words, the

Development Agreement merely allowed Greystone to "pre-pay" community housing fees by

3

Had Ordinance No 819 applied, Greys tone would have had to earmark 20% of its development to affordable
workforce housing.
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deeding real property instead of paying money to the City. The language of the Development
Agreement demonstrates that the parties both understood that Greystone would have to pay
community housing fees as part of pulling building pennits. In fact, when Greystone pulled
building permits it did not pay the fee despite Ordinance No. 820, which required payment on all
building permit applications. SeeR. Vol. II, p. 226,

~

6, pp. 229-49. Reading all inferences in

favor of Greystone, the non moving party, the district court should have found that material
issues of fact existed on the issue ofvoluntariness.
Affidavits Establish Genuine Issue ofMaterial Fact:
Four affidavits submitted by Greystone establish genuine issues of material fact on the
Issue of voluntariness.

Greystone submitted affidavits from a former member of the City

Council present during the relevant times in this lawsuit stating that community housing, in her
opinion and experience, was not "voluntary," even before enactment of the relevant ordinances
(SeeR. Vol. II, p. 219,

~~

2-4). The City Council member also stated that she was aware that

staff was instructed to exact community housing fees from developers. Id.
Greystone's engineer submitted an affidavit that stated community housing was not
addressed in the application and community housing was a necessary component of the project.
SeeR. Vol. II, pp. 302-03,

~~5-8).

The engineer also states that during his meetings with City

representatives "it was clearly implied that Greystone had to do something to satisfy the City on
the issue of affordable housing, and that Greystone had to address affordable housing." R. Vol.
II, p. 302,

~

6. Likewise, Greystone's accountant submitted an affidavit stating that he did not

seek a deduction on Greystone's taxes because the lots were not a charitable contribution, but
were conveyed to pay fees required by the City and thus could not qualify for a tax deductible
donation. SeeR. Vol. II, p. 223. Finally, Appellant Richard Hehr, testified in his affidavit that
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he did not convey the lots as a contribution to the City, but that they were conveyed in lieu of
paying fees to the city for community housing. SeeR. Vol. II, pp. 226-27, ~~ 7-8.
The four affidavits discussed above, read in a light most favorable to Greystone raises
genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. Nonetheless, these affidavits are
not referenced in the district court's Memorandum Decision, nor is there any explanation for
how or why these affidavits fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of
voluntariness. Viewed in a light most favorable to Greystone, these facts should be heard by a
jury, not disposed of on summary judgment.
McCall's Internal Memorandum:
As part of its Motion for Reconsideration, Greystone produced an internal memorandum
prepared by a City Planner to Staff titled "Subject: Advising applicants about voluntary
affordable housing mitigation payment." R. Vol. III, p. 442. Pursuant to this memorandum, land
use applicants were required to "offer a form of affordable housing mitigation that is in keeping
with the spirit and intent of the housing policy and ordinances that has [sic] been adopted by the
City." !d.

If the "offer" was not sufficient to the City, staff was instructed to return the

application:
If they propose a means of compensation as mitigation that is clearly insufficient
we should just return the permit to them with a comment that in our judgment the
form of consideration does not resolve the effect the construction of the residence
will have on the City's affordable housing needs.
!d. This quoted language illustrates the City's coercive conduct to require applicants to pay a

fee, but yet paint it as a voluntary act on the part of the fee payer. This conduct is confirmed by
the affidavit of the City Council member who testified that City planning officials instructed
Staff to exact community housing fees from developers prior to the enactment of Ordinance Nos.
819 and 820. R. Vol. II, p. 219, ~~ 3-4.
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Taken together, and considered in a light most favorable to Greystone, the internal
memorandum and affidavits create genuine issues of material fact as to whether Greystone's
payment of community housing fees was, in fact, voluntary. As such, this Court should reverse
the district court's grant of summary judgment.
Misapplication of KMST:
The district court also held that Greystone acted voluntarily under KMST, LLC v. County
ofAda, 138 Idaho 577, 67 P.3d 56 (2003), because Greystone voluntarily donated the nine lots at
issue. KMST does not compel the result reached by the district court.
In KMST, the developer, prior to submitting its land use application, met twice with
ACHD's representative in order to determine what recommendations regarding KMST's
development the ACHD staff would make. KMST, at 579-580, 67 P.3d at 58-59. The ACHD
representative informed KMST that "he would recommend that KMST be required to construct a
street.. .and dedicate that street to the public." KMST, at 580, 67 P.3d at 59. Based on that
conversation, KMST submitted, along with its application, a statement that it would construct a
public street and that such street would be the primary access for the development. !d. KMST
later sued the county, including for a taking of its property related to the public road it built.
In KMST this Court held that no taking had occurred because ACHD had no final
authority to approve or reject the property owners' proposed development. KMST, at 582, 67
P.3d at 61. Moreover, this Court stated, in dicta, that even if ACHD did have final authority to
approve some aspect of the development, there was no taking because the KMST voluntarily
included the dedication of the street based on the conversation it had with the ACHD supervisor.
!d.

In this case, the factual scenario is distinguishable from KMST v. Ada County where the
applicant suggested, in its application, that it dedicate a roadway.
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Greystone's application,

unlike KMST's application, did not include any statement about community housing or
voluntarily donating community housing. SeeR. Vol. II, p. 302,

~

5. As discussed above, the

language the district court attributes to Greystone as part of its application was, in fact,
statements made by the City. There is no evidence in the record to support the district court's
finding that Greystone deeded the nine lots voluntarily. Therefore, KMST is inapplicable.
V.

Did the district court err in holding that Greystone failed to exhaust administrative
remedies?

The district court also granted summary judgment on grounds that Greystone failed to
exhaust administrative remedies. This was in error because the district court misapplied the
exceptions to the exhausting administrative remedies rule.
As a general rule, a party must exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the
courts to challenge the validity of administrative acts. Arnzen v. State, 123 Idaho 899, 906, 854
P .2d 242, 249 (1993). There are two recognized exceptions to this rule: (a) when the interests of
justice so require, and (b) when the agency acted outside its authority.

Regan v. Kootenai

County, 140 Idaho 721,725, 100 P.3d 615,619 (2004).

In this case, Greystone's claims meet both exceptions to the general rule of exhaustion.
First, the City acted outside its authority by requiring the payment of community housing fees. It
is an adjudicated fact that the City acted outside its authority in requiring the payment of
community housing fees, and that Ordinance No. 820 was unconstitutional.

Groenevelt

Affidavit, Ex. U.
Second, the interests of justice exception also compel application of the exhaustion
exception. As demonstrated by McCall's internal memorandum, the City's policy was that it
would not process an application unless it provided for what the City considered sufficient
community housing fees. The interests of justice are best served by requiring the City to return
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or reimburse Greystone for a fee that the City had no legal authority to collect and that Greystone
had no obligation to pay.
The City argued below, and the district court agreed, that under KMST the exceptions to
the exhaustion requirement only apply to "facial" challenges of ordinances and statutes, and that
this case is an "as applied" challenge. No Idaho case stands for this proposition. The district
court, in following the City's lead, relies on the holding in the White v. Bannock County
Commissioners, 139 Idaho 396, 80 P.3d 332 (2003), for the proposition that the exhaustion

exceptions only apply to "facial" challenges. SeeR. Vol. II, p. 368.
White does not include any such holding. The decision does not even use the terms "as

applied" or "facial," or analyze the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement other than to
summarily state at the conclusion of the decision that the exceptions did not apply to that
particular case. Neither White nor any other Idaho case holds that the exhaustion exceptions
apply only to "facial" challenges. See also American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dept.
of Water Resources, 143 Idaho 862, 870-73, 154 P.3d 433,441-43 (2007) (stating that in an "as

applied" challenge, administrative remedies must first be exhausted for purposes of establishing
a factual record when the traditional exceptions to the exhaustion requirement do not apply, but
that the traditional exceptions to the general rule apply).
VI.

Did the district court err in holding that Greystone's takings claim based on the U.S.
Constitution was not ripe and/or was barred under the two year statute of
limitations?

The district court erroneously dismissed Greystone's claims based on the federal
constitution and federal law. In its motion below the City argued, and the district court agreed,
that the federal law claims were barred because Greystone: (1) was required to bring federal
claims under Section 1983; (2) its federal claims were unripe pursuant to Williamson County
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Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); and (3)
that a two year statute oflimitations applies to Greystone's federal claims.
A.

Greystone was not required to bring its inverse condemnation claim or other
Federal claims under Section 1983 and is not barred by the two year statute
of limitations for section 1983 claims.

Greystone has not sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, nor was it required to do so to
maintain an inverse condemnation action for a violation of the Fifth Amendment. In its Motion
for Summary Judgment below, the City argued that Greystone's federal claims can only be
brought as a § 1983 claim, which requires application of the two year statute of limitation under
Idaho Code section 5-219. The United States Supreme Court has established that a party is
entitled to bring an inverse condemnation action directly under the Fifth Amendment. See First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County, Cal. 482 U.S. 304,
314-315, (1987) (recognizing that "a landowner is entitled to bring an action m mverse
condemnation as a result of 'the self executing nature ... ' of the Fifth Amendment.)
In BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 141 Idaho 168, 175, 108 P.3d 315,322 (2004),
this Court similarly recognized that a federal inverse condemnation claim may be brought
directly under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In BHA Investments this Court
recognized that "[claimants] have asserted their federal claim directly under the Takings Clause
in the United States Constitution." Id. at 176 n.2, 108 P.3d at 323 n.2. The BHA Investments
Court also stated that: "The Takings Clause [of the Fifth Amendment] is self-executing, and a
takings claim may be based solely upon it, First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, or it
may be brought as an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey, Ltd." Id. (internal citations omitted). Thus, according both this Court and the U.S.
Supreme Court Greystone may submit a claim directly under the Fifth Amendment.
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Since

Greystone is not required to proceed under Section 1983, the two year statute of limitation of
Idaho Code section 5-219 is not applicable to its federal inverse condemnation claim.
B.

This case is distinguishable from Williamson County and the ripeness test is
inapplicable.

In granting summary judgment, the district court held that Greystone's Fifth Amendment
taking claim was not ripe for review under Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v.

Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). R. Vol. II, p. 369. Williamson County
requires that: (1) the governmental entity reach a final decision; and (2) in federal court litigation
involving regulatory takings, the property owner must "seek compensation through the
procedures the State has provided for doing so." Williamson County, at 186, 194. Neither of
these ripeness tests, however, prohibits Greystone's federal takings claims under the facts and
circumstances of this case.

1.

Williamson County's first ripeness test is inapplicable in this case.

In Williamson County, a land owner sued alleging that a county's newly enacted zoning
ordinance amounted to a taking of his property because the new zoning ordinance reduced the
density of buildable units in the project.

Williamson County, 105 U.S. at 175-82. Under the

applicable land use and subdivision ordinances, the landowner could have sought a variance
from the county's zoning ordinance density reduction, but instead sued for a taking of property.

Jd. This proved fatal for the land owner's claim because the Williamson County Court held that
the takings claim was not ripe because the landowner failed to first obtain a final decision from
the county regarding the application the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations to the
property. Jd. at 186. The Williamson County Court held that the landowner's claim was not ripe
because the landowner could have sought a variance to have more buildable lots than what the
county's zoning ordinance allowed. ld., at 191.
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In this case, the first ripeness test of Williamson County is inapplicable for two reasons.
First, the City has already physically taken Greystone's property by receiving deed to the nine
lots at issue. The "first Williamson County requirement is automatically satisfied at the time of
the physical taking." Daniel v. County of Santa Barbara, 288 F.3d 375, 382 (9th Cir. 2002); see
also Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1281 n. 28 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that
"[ w ]here there has been a physical invasion, the taking occurs at once, and nothing the city can
do or say after that point will change that fact.") (overruled on other grounds by Yee v. City of
Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992)).
Second, there was no variance for Greystone to seek.

Nothing under Idaho law or

McCall's ordinances allow for a variance from paying a community housing fee. Unlike the law
applicable to the landowner in Williamson County where state and local law provided for a
variance as a potential remedy, no such variance or waiver existed for Greystone. The record in
this case is undisputed that if an applicant objected to the payment of community housing fees,
or the offer was not sufficient, McCall's policy was to return the application. R. Vol. III, p. 442.
2.

Williamson County's Second Ripeness Test is Inapplicable in this
Case.

The district court likewise ruled that Greys tone's failed to meet the second part of the
Williamson County ripeness test because Greystone did not first seek judicial review of the
City's actions. This misinterprets Williamson County's second ripeness test. The second prong
of the Williamson County ripeness test requires that a property owner first seek just
compensation through a state inverse condemnation, and be denied, before litigating in federal
court.

Williamson County, at 194. The second ripeness test is not an exhaustion doctrine or

exhaustion requirement.

The Plaintiffs have filed this action before this state court seeking

among other things, inverse condemnation. Thus, the second Williamson County ripeness test is
inapplicable in this case.
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VII.

When is the deadline to file notice of a tort claim triggered under the Idaho Tort
Claims Act when a city passes a resolution creating a right to a refund of fees?
The district court dismissed Greystone's state-based claims because Greystone failed to

timely provide notice to the City under the Idaho Tort Claims Act ("ITCA"). R. Vol. II, p. 363.
The district court erred in dismissing Greystone's state-based claims on this basis because it
failed to consider that the City's passage of Resolution 08-11 created a new claim against the
City.
Tort claims against a political subdivision must be presented within 180 days from the
date the claim arose. I.C. § 6-906. Presenting the claim within that time frame is a condition
precedent to an action against a public subdivision.

I.C. § 6-908.

The ITCA's notice

requirements apply to claims against a city. I.C. § 50-219; Magnusen Prop. P'ship v. City of

Coeur d'Alene, 138 Idaho 166, 169, 59 P.3d 971, 974 (2002).
In this case, Greystone does not dispute more than 180 days have passed since Greystone
originally conveyed the nine lots and paid the costs to construct roadway improvements to the
nine lots. The City, however, created a new claim by passing Resolution 08-11 on April 24,
2008, after its Ordinance No. 820 was found illegal. Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. W. Resolution
08-11 provided for a refund of Community Housing fees collected under Ordinance No. 820 and
Resolution 09-10, enacted on November 4, 2009, extended the period to obtain a refund of
Community Housing fees collected under Ordinance No. 820 until December 31, 2009.
Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. X.
Greystone filed a Refund Request Form on November 12, 2009. Groenevelt Affidavit,
Ex. Y. The form was provided by the City and the information provided by Greystone, in all
material respects, complied with the contents required in a notice of tort claim under the ITCA.

See I.C. § 6-907. The evidence in the record establishes that Greystone provided notice such that
its state-based claims should not have been dismissed by the district court.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Greystone respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
district court's decisions in its June 16, 2011, Memorandum Decision and its October 18, 2011,
Memorandum Decision granting the City summary judgment, and remand this case to the district
court for a trial on the merits of Greystone' s claims against McCall.
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